Abstract. We present a new approach for proving safety properties of reactive systems, based on tight interaction between static analysis, theorem proving and abstraction techniques. The method incrementally constructs a proof or nds a counterexample. Every step consists of applying one of the techniques and makes constructive use of information obtained from failures in previous steps. The amount of user intervention is limited and is highly guided by the system at each step. We demonstrate the method on three simple examples, and show that by using it one can prove more properties than by using each component as a stand-alone.
Introduction
Theorem proving GM95, ORS+95, CCF+97] 1 is a powerful and general way to verify safety properties of reactive systems, but its use in mechanical veri cation requires a serious amount of both insightful and labor-intensive manual guidance from the human veri er. Model checking BCM+92, H91, LPY97] is largely automatic but it only addresses a limited class of essentially nite-state system. Abstraction SUM96, DGG97, GS97, BLO98, CU98] can be used to translate an in nite-state system to a nite-state systems so as to preserve the property being veri ed. This can reduce the manual burden of the veri cation but the discovery of a suitable property-preserving abstraction takes considerable human ingenuity. Furthermore, when the abstracted system fails veri cation, this could either be because the abstraction was too coarse or because the system did not satisfy the property. It takes deep insight to draw useful information from such a failure. This paper addresses these problems by presenting a methodology for integrating static analysis CC77, HPR97, BL], theorem proving, and abstraction that does not tax the patience and ingenuity of the human veri er. In this methodology 1. The choice of the abstraction mapping can be guided by the subgoals in a failed proof attempt. 2. A failed veri cation attempt at the abstract level suggests either strengthened invariants or a more re ned abstraction. 3. The iterative process, when it terminates, yields a counterexample indicating how the property is violated or a proof that the property is satis ed. We also show that the combination of abstraction and theorem proving is strictly more powerful than veri cation based on theorem proving with systematic dynamic invariant strengthening techniques.
In our method, the veri cation starts with a one-time use of static analysis, generating true-by-construction invariants that are communicated to both the theoremproving and abstraction components. The rest of the process involves a tight interaction between the prover and abstraction generator, in which each step makes constructive use of information obtained from failures in previous steps. The method assists the user in discovering relevant auxiliary invariants and suitable abstraction mappings while progressing towards a proof or a counterexample. Using this \small increments" approach the required amount of user ingenuity is reduced. Instead of having to rely on keen insight of the problem right from the start, the user gains increasing insight as she progresses in the veri cation task, enabling her to conclude eventually.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some basic terminology and an overview of the static analysis, theorem proving and abstraction techniques that we are using. Section 3 presents our approach for integrating these techniques, which we introduce through the veri cation of a simple example. Section 4 contains a formal comparison of the relative power of the theorem proving and abstraction techniques, together with an example demonstrating that our method is strictly more powerful than using each component as a stand-alone. We conclude in Section 5 and present some future work directions.
The Components
We use transition systems as a computational model for reactive programs. A transition system T consists of a nite set of typed variables V , an initial condition and a nite set of guarded transitions T . The variables can be either control or data variables; the control variables are of a nite type Location. Each transition 2 T is labeled and consists of a guard and an assignment. A state is a type-consistent valuation of the variables, and the initial condition is a predicate on states. Each transition induces a transition relation relating the possible before and after states. The global transition relation of the system is T = S 2T .
A computation of the transition system is an in nite sequence of states, in which the rst state satis es the initial condition and every two consecutive states are in the transition relation. The parallel (asynchronous) composition of transition systems is de ned using interleaving in the usual manner. 
Static Analysis
For automatically generating invariants we use a method similar to that suggested by BLO98]. The analysis starts by computing local invariants at every control location: the local invariant of a control location l is the disjunction of post (true), for all transitions leading to l. Then, the local invariants are propagated to other control locations of the system to obtain global invariants. For example, in the simple transition system illustrated below, static analysis yields the local invariant 2 (pc = 1 x 0). Then, since x 0 is preserved by transition inc, it is a global invariant. Otherwise, the prover presents a number of pending (unproved) subgoals: each subgoal results from the fact that I is not preserved by some transition. We then apply the invariance rule to the predicate obtained by taking the conjunction of I and all the unproved subgoals: this amounts to attempting to prove that I^f pre(I) is inductive. If there exists an n such that (1) holds, then repeating this process n times would eliminate all the subgoals and complete the proof. This leads to a fully automatic procedure (that is not guaranteed to halt).
Abstraction
We use the abstraction technique described in GS97]. The abstraction of a concrete transition system T relative to a nite set of state predicates B = fB 1 ; : : : ; B k g called boolean abstract variables, is a transition system denoted T=B. The states of the abstract system T=B are called abstract states; every abstract state is labeled with a valuation of the control variables of T and of the abstract variables. Let us now brie y describe how T=B is constructed. The initial abstract state is labeled with the initial control con guration of T and with the truth values of the abstract variables at the initial concrete state. Assume now that s A is an abstract state, the abstract transitions going out of s A are then generated. Every concrete transition , originating from a concrete state with the same control con guration as s A , can give rise to several abstract transitions. Each of these transitions will have the same label as and lead to an abstract state obtained by computing (with Pvs) the e ect of (starting from s A ) on the control and abstract variables. Consider, for example, the concrete system illustrated below. An abstraction relative to B 1 : (x = 0) and B 2 : (x = 1) generates the abstract system (a); while an abstraction only relative to B 2 yields the abstract system (b), of which only the initial portion is shown. Note that in the latter, simulating the concrete transition inc gives rise to two successors. This is because starting at the initial abstract state, where :(x = 1) holds, the transition inc performing x := x + 1 can either lead to a state in which (x = 1) is true, or to a state in which the latter is false. Note also that in the abstract system (a), the only state labeled pc = 2 is also labeled Consequently, boolean abstractions are useful for proving invariants, since T=B j = ABS 2 ' ) T j = 2 ':
In general, an abstraction relative to a larger set of abstract variables can \show" more properties, because the prover has more information at its disposal when new abstract states are generated, therefore it can eliminate some of them, yielding a ner abstraction. Also, constructing an abstraction with some known invariants of the concrete system can assist in eliminating irrelevant abstract states.
The Integration
We introduce our approach for integrating the previously discussed static analysis, theorem proving and abstraction techniques. The general scheme is presented in Fig. 1 . The property to be proved is that it is never the case that all three processes are in their critical sections simultaneously; this is expressed as 2 I with I : :((pc 1 = cs)^(pc 2 = cs)^(pc 3 = cs)):
The rst step is to employ the Invariant generator. This yields the global invariant: 2 (S 0), which is fed to the Theorem prover and to the Abstraction generator, since it contains relevant information that may be useful in the sequel. The next step is to apply theorem proving in trying to prove that I is inductive. In our case, I is not inductive, and therefore the proof is not completed. Rather, we are presented with three (symmetric) pending subgoals, resulting from transitions that do not preserve I. For example, the following subgoal is related to transition Obviously, the only way to prove this implication is to show that the assumption is contradictory; but I alone is too weak to prove it. The user now has two alternatives: either to remain in the prover and try to strengthen I, or to try to prove the pending subgoals using an abstraction. User-dependent decisions are represented in the diagram of Fig. 1 T=f(S > 0)g. The generated abstract system is then passed to the Trace analyzer together with a user-de ned wish. A wish is a transition-related state property to be checked on the abstract system which, if shown correct, would enable to eliminate an unproved subgoal. The transition to which a wish refers is that who gave rise to the corresponding subgoal.
Formulating a wish is straightforward. For example, a wish corresponding to the subgoal above is: \for every abstract transition labeled request 3 , if the origin abstract state is labeled pc 1 = cs and pc 2 = cs then it is also labeled :(S > 0)". This means that either mutual exclusion is not guaranteed by the program, or that the abstraction is too coarse. To decide between these two we must check whether this violating trace can be matched by a concrete computation. This task is performed by the Trace simulator, by simulating the transitions of the violating trace on the concrete system. It checks whether after every transition the valuation of the abstract variables in the concrete and abstract systems coincide. If this is the case, then we have a counterexample. Here, it is not the case, since a miss-match is detected in the third abstract state: according to the concrete computation, S = 0 should hold, but in the abstract system, S > 0 holds. Thus, the abstraction is too coarse. In this situation, the simulator outputs a warning message indicating what \went wrong" in the abstraction; this information is obtained by computing the f pre-images of the abstract variables on the violating trace. In our example, the message suggests that the abstraction \believes" that initially S > 2 holds.
The user has now two options to pursue. The rst is to do another abstraction relative to a larger set of abstract variables (obtained by adding the new ones suggested by the trace simulator as \responsible" for the miss-matches). For example, S > 2 is a new relevant abstract variable. The second option is to formulate a conjecture and try to prove it in the theorem prover. A conjecture is an auxiliary invariant that would assist in generating a ner abstraction. In our case, an obvious conjecture is 2 (S 2). If it was proved, then taking it into account when the next abstraction is computed would eliminate some abstract traces (e.g., the previous violating trace).
We pursue the latter alternative. The proof of 2 (S 2) does not succeed in one invariant strengthening step. From the new unproved subgoals we extract two new abstract variables: (S 2) and (S 1). We compute the abstract system T=f(S > 0); (S 2)(S 1)g, which is ne enough to grant our original wishes.
Armed with this information the prover eliminates the (original) unproved subgoals and completes the proof of mutual exclusion.
As another example, we consider a version of the alternating bit protocol taken from GS97] (see Fig. 2 below) . There are three processes: sender, receiver and environment. The sender generates messages, records them in the sent list, then sends them to the receiver over the communication medium message channel. The latter is modeled as a one-place bu er that can hold a message and a bit. The receiver records successfully received messages in the received list and sends an acknowledgment through the one-place bu er ack channel. The environment can lose messages and acknowledgements by setting the boolean ags message present and ack present to False. This causes the sender/receiver respectively to retransmit. The safety property to be proved, is that the (unbounded) lists sent and received always di er by at most one message: 2 (sent = received _ sent = tail(received)).
The rst step, static analysis, yields two invariants that are fed to the prover and to the abstraction generator. The next step is theorem proving, and since the property is not inductive, the proof is not completed. There are three pending subgoals, all of which are related to transitions that update the sent/received lists.
For example, we have to prove that at the origin of transition receive message: sent = tail(received). We take this predicate as an abstract variable, and formu-late the above as a wish. (We also used two other similar abstract variables and corresponding wishes which are omitted here.)
After the abstraction has been computed, the trace analyzer returns a violating trace in which a receive message transition is taken from the initial abstract state. From the trace simulator we get a warning message indicating that the problem occurred because the transition receive message should not have been enabled initially, and that the predicate \responsible" for this is the conjunct message channel.bit = c in the guard of the transition.
The obvious choice now is to take this predicate as a new abstract variable and to redo an abstraction. Still, the second abstraction does not grant our wishes; a new violating trace is detected and another abstract variable is suggested by the same mechanism described above. The third abstraction grants all original wishes, and then the prover completes the proof.
In GS97] the same protocol is analyzed by an abstraction relative to a set of sub-formulas of the guards, and human inspection of the generated abstract system is necessary to conclude that the protocol is indeed correct. Our approach is different: the abstract variables are suggested to the user by the failures of previous proof attempts and abstractions; the analysis of the abstract system is automatic and it issues information to the user; and in the end we obtain a complete rigorous proof.
Our method can be automated in signi cant proportion. Indeed, all the components in the diagram (Fig. 1 ) perform automatic tasks, and user intervention is basically limited to choosing between abstraction and theorem proving. In both cases, the user is assisted in providing the relevant abstract variables, wishes and conjectures by the pending subgoals in the prover and by the warning messages issued by the trace simulator. The method is incremental: progress is made in each step, as every relevant abstract variable and conjecture reduces the search space; and the user gains insight of the problem while progressing towards a proof or a counterexample. Finally, we show in the next section that by integrating the components it is possible to prove more properties than by automatic invariant strengthening or automatic abstraction as stand-alones.
Integration is More Powerful
We now de ne the class of safety properties that can be proved to be invariant by the automatic invariant strengthening technique described in Section 2.2. It should be stressed that choosing the abstract variables from I; f pre(I); : : : ; f pre n (I) is not arbitrary: the guards of transitions, which in many cases allow to generate useful control abstractions GS97] are just sub-formulas of these predicates.
Note that both f pre-invariant strengthening and f pre-abstraction are fully automatic techniques. Under the assumption that the same \reasoning power" is used for both f pre-invariant strengthening and f pre-abstraction (for example, both use the same theorem prover), the following result holds. In our method, when trying to prove a safety property 2 I, the abstract variables and conjectures are also variants of sub-formulas of AV (I). As is shown in the following example, however, our method is strictly more powerful than the fully automatic techniques of f pre-invariant strengthening and of f pre-abstractions. The example is a mutual-exclusion algorithm taken from BGP97], and is based on the same principle as the well-known Bakery Algorithm: using \tickets" to control access to the critical section. The program is illustrated in Fig. 3 : two global variables t 1 and t 2 are used for keeping record of ticket values, and two local variables a and b control the entry to the critical sections. We employ our method to prove this property. Static analysis generates the local invariants pc 1 = cs a t 1 and pc 2 = cs b t 1 , which are then passed to the theorem prover and to the abstraction generator. Theorem proving yields two unproved subgoals, from which we identify the predicates (a t 1 ) and (b t 1 ) as relevant abstract variables (note that these predicates are simply the guards).
The wish associated with the transition in-a is: \any abstract state labeled pc 1 = nc; pc 2 = cs is also labeled :(a t 1 ) ". That is, the guard (a t 1 ) should prevent the rst process from entering its critical section while the second is already there.
A similar wish is associated with the transition in-b.
The rst abstraction does not grant these wishes. A violating trace is produced by the trace analyzer and fed to the trace simulator, which identi es it as not corresponding to a concrete computation; thus, the abstraction is too coarse.
By computing f pre-images of the abstract variable (a t 1 ), the system outputs a warning message indicating that the error occurred since the abstraction \believes" that initially: t 1 t 2 ? 1.
The user now has two options. The rst is to add t 1 t 2 ? 1 as a new abstract variable and do another abstraction. The second is to formulate a conjecture and try to prove it. Choosing the former alternative is reasonable since it would undoubtedly result in a ner abstraction. When it is not too di cult to come up with a conjecture, however, the latter is preferred. This is because a proved (stronger) conjecture usually eliminates more violating traces in further abstractions, and therefore signi cantly reduces the number of iterations. In our example this is the case, since it is easy to see that whenever both processes are at their init location, the stronger relation t 1 = t 2 (rather than t 1 t 2 ? 1) should hold (this is true initially, and any loop that goes back to the init locations increases both t 1 and t 2 by one). So, we formulate the conjecture instead of 2 (pc 1 = init^pc 2 = init :(t 1 t 2 ? 1)) as suggested by the system.)
This demonstrates a typical use of the methodology, in which the detailed feedback from the system together with moderate amount of user ingenuity yields the relevant auxiliary invariant. This is in contrast to an ordinary theorem proving process, in which the user usually has to invest much more e ort to come up with suitable auxiliary invariants.
Conclusion and Future Work
As an attempt to address the problem of the signi cant user ingenuity that is required to come up with appropriate auxiliary invariants or with suitable abstraction mappings, we have presented a new methodology for integrating static analysis, theorem proving and abstractions. The key features of our approach are It is incremental: each step is based on information obtained from failures of previous steps. When the iterative process terminates, it yields a proof or a counterexample. It is goal-directed: abstractions are guided by a subgoals in a failed proof attempt. It is partially automatic: each component performs an automatic task, the user chooses which component to invoke at each step and how to apply it.
User input is highly guided by information provided by the system. It is general, in principle, and not dependent on a particular implementation of the components. For the experiments described in the paper we have used Pvs 
